Two days later, epidemiologic investigation indicated that all patients with diagnosed cases were related and that, in all likelihood, the outbreak had been successfully halted through tracing the movements of the various patients and vaccinating anyone who had contact with them, socalled "ring" vaccination (4) . Despite this halt of the outbreak, the city pushed forward. The campaign to "Be sure, be safe, get vaccinated!" had proven successful. By city estimate, >600,000 persons had received vaccine in the first week.
Vaccine side effects, which dominate coverage of today's vaccination program, were seldom discussed in 1947. Dr. Weinstein assured residents, "Vaccination is painless. The skin is not even broken by the needle. Sometimes a soreness develops in the armpit. If the arm becomes very sore, apply an icebag" (4). This advice is simple compared to the depth and breadth of information given today to a potential vaccinee. Now, volunteers are given several informational lectures and a protracted individual interview to discuss lingering questions, and they are required to sign a document confirming adequate comprehension and acceptance of the risks.
In the 1947 campaign, trouble began on April 16, when (no longer on page 1), the Times announced, "Vaccinations Stop; Drug Supply Gone; Thousands Turned Away" (5) . With little warning, and at the height of the program, the vaccine supply vanished, something that was never explained. After spending days gearing up citizens to receive the vaccine quickly, the mayor and Dr. Weinstein now had to downplay the urgency of receiving vaccination. They assured New Yorkers that a delay of a few days or more represented "no health hazard" (5) .
Of the 1.2 million doses distributed by April 16, 1947, 42,000 had been supplied by private laboratories, far short of the promised number. In contrast, the Army and Navy had given almost 800,000 doses, and the city's public health laboratories had made the remaining 400,000.
During the shortage, the Times noted, "hundreds of eager men, women, and children queued up at Bellevue Hospital at dawn, although vaccinations were not scheduled to begin until 10 a.m. At some stations, the crowds did not take kindly to the news that the doctors had run out of vaccine and the police had a little difficulty dispersing a crowd of several hundred" outside one vaccine station (5).
On April 17, the situation brightened, when more than a million doses suddenly arrived from private laboratories, and 500,000 persons were vaccinated (6) . As the crisis slowly lessened, doctors were recruited at US$8 (US$64 in today's market) for a 3-hour session (or US$24 for all day; US$192 in today's market) to administer vaccine, but few volunteered. Public health authorities in Westchester County chided local physicians for charging $35 per vaccine (7), and a 29-year-old woman, dressed up as a nurse, vaccinated 500 people with water to impress her "man companion" until she was sent to the Bellevue psychiatric ward for evaluation (8) .
Continued complaints about side effects were dismissed by Dr. Weinstein, who again advised those whose arm ached that they only needed to place an icebag in the armpit for relief. Within a week, the program had wound down and been proclaimed "a miracle" (2) by all involved.
The claim of 5 or 6 million vaccinations administered cannot be reconciled against the daily tally reported in the Times. If one assumes that day-today numbers reported in the newspaper were roughly accurate, a simple calculation places the number of vaccinees closer to 2.5 million, far short of the announced total. For example, on April 21, a grand total of 3.45 mil-lion recipients were reported; the next day, after noting that only 200,000 additional persons had received vaccine, the total swelled to 4.4 million (9) .
These data reflect the difficulties intrinsic to managing such a massive program. The discrepancy may simply be a case of not adding columns of numbers in a systematic way; however, the fuzzy numbers do have a certain appeal to the modern, more cynical reader.
Whatever occurred, understanding the specifics of "the great vaccination miracle" of 1947 is important for maintaining equilibrium during our current smallpox vaccination program and any future programs directed at now-unanticipated infections. Not just New York City's, but the entire country's sense of confidence that it can handle a major rapid vaccination or pill distribution campaign leans very heavily on the apocryphal vaccine campaign of April 1947. Yet, as described above, there may be much less to the miracle than meets the eye. Suppose that the 1947 smallpox vaccine indeed caused serious cardiac disease, including myopericarditis and myocardial infarctions, with 10 fatal cases per million. Viewed in perspective, this would approximate the historic rate of vaccine-induced encephalitis and would be well in excess of the historic rate of progressive vaccinia. In this scenario, at a hypothetical incidence of 10 per million, from 21 to 64 of the 1,545 cardiac deaths (1.4% to 4.1%, respectively) would have been caused by the vaccine. This magnitude of effect would have been very difficult to detect in this study. Thus, the results of such investigations must be considered in the context of power limitations. Further, studying death rates sheds no light on cardiac illness such as myo-or pericarditis.
The proper interpretation of these data is important given the national policy impact that resulted from the observation of cardiac and coronary illness and death after vaccination in 2003. At this time, adverse cardiac events associated with the vaccine, particularly myo-or pericarditis, are still of concern. Whether coronary or cardiac deaths can be attributed to the vaccine remains an open question.
